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Response to the UK Parliament Energy and Climate Change Committee, Enquiry on 
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) 
 
Dr Simon Shackley, Dr Leslie Mabon and Benjamin Evar 
School of GeoSciences, University of Edinburgh 
 
1. Summary of Main Points 
 
Our submission focuses upon public perceptions of, and engagement with, CCS. This issue has 
risen in importance since proposed CCS projects at Barendrecht (Netherlands), Beeskow 
(Germany) and Greenville (USA) stumbled in large part due to public opposition. The proposed 
Hunterston power plant + partial CCS development in Scotland encountered strong local and 
NGO opposition and partial CCS at the proposed new Kingsnorth coal power plant did not 
ameliorate NGO furore. Some claim that offshore CO2 storage will be of no (or minimal) concern 
to the public but this ignores Brent Spa, the legacy of the Gulf of Mexico drilling disaster, 
controversies over offshore renewables development, the necessary onshore infrastructure and 
the importance of values which do not correspond with land/sea boundaries. CCS has become a 
prism for the playing out of different values about our energy future – to what extent should it 
depend upon large centralized power plants rather than much more distributed generation?  To 
what extent should it continue to depend upon coal?  Will CCS lock us more deeply into the 
fossil fuel economy, beyond which we urgently need to progress according to many; or might 
CCS provide us with the breathing-space to develop renewables – a sort of bridge to a genuinely 
sustainable low-carbon energy future?  How long should that bridge be and could it be forever 
extended as policy makers and industry invest more into expensive fossil fuel and CCS 
infrastructure?  What is the risk of CO2 stores in rock formations leaking? Such questions rapidly 
emerge when members of the public participate in discussion and focus groups on CCS. Most of 
these questions cannot be answered by scientists and herein lies a problem since there are 
precious few avenues for the public to have a debate about what role CCS might have in the 
near and medium-term future and its relative importance vis-à-vis other low-carbon options 
such as renewables, energy efficiency, demand reduction and nuclear. We review what is 
known about public perceptions of CCS and provide recommendations to Government and 
developers on how to better engage with publics for more resilient decision-making in terms of 
both process and outcome.  
 
2.  Introduction  
 
We are social scientists who have been working on CCS policy, public perception and technology 
assessment issues since 2000 (Shackley), 2009 (Evar) and 2011 (Mabon). In addition to past 
work for Tyndall, DECC and IEA, we have been involved in recent projects such as EU SiteChar (a 
5-day citizens’ panel on perceptions of CCS in Moray, NE Scotland) (2010-12), EU ECO2 (public 
and stakeholder perceptions of offshore CO2 storage in Scotland and Yorkshire & Humberside) 
(2011-2015) and the Global CCS Institute-funded Large Group Process on public perceptions of 
low-carbon energy technologies (involving 100 members of the Edinburgh public) (2011) 
(http://www.globalccsinstitute.com/publications/public-perceptions-low-carbon-energy-
technologies-results-scottish-large-group-process).  We are happy to supply the Committee with 
papers, reports and other documentary material upon request.   
 
3.  Overview of Findings on Public Perceptions  
 
 In this note we limit ourselves to consideration of the social issues surrounding development 
of large-scale integrated CCS projects.   
 It is well known that adverse public reactions to a number of large CCS projects 
internationally contributed to their early termination. The best known example is Shell’s 
proposed CCS facility at Barendrecht (Netherlands), but other examples are Vattenfall’s 
proposed facility at Beeskow (Brandenburg, Germany) and public opposition to the US-based 
projects in Greenville (Ohio) and Carson (California).  A detailed analysis of past CCS projects 
internationally and analysis of the public perceptions and controversies can be found in 
Hammond, J. and Shackley, S. (2010), Towards a Public Communication and Engagement 
Strategy for Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage Projects in Scotland: A Review of Research 
Findings, CCS Project Experiences, Tools, Resources and Best Practices (159pp, written for the 
Scottish CCS Initiative, Phase II) (http://carbcap.geos.ed.ac.uk/website/publications/sccs-
wp/wp-2010-08.pdf). A useful review and analysis of European experience is in the paper 
Otra et al. (2012), ‘Public response to CO2 storage sites: lessons from five European cases’, 
Energy & Environment 23(2/3): 227-248).  
 Why do (sections of) the public object to planned CCS projects and to the idea of CCS as a 
climate change mitigation option?  There is no single reason but we can perhaps identify the 
following.  
 Value-differences on energy futures.  Some people prefer to see a decentralised electricity 
supply system based on renewables rather than a continuation of the existing reliance on gas 
and coal in a centralised system, which CCS implicitly supports. Some people are also 
concerned that a strong focus on technological ‘fixes’ overlooks the need for behavioural 
change, and would prefer to see more emphasis on energy efficiency. 
 Value-differences on use of coal. Some people object to the continued extraction and use of 
coal.  Even if electricity generation from coal could be made much less carbon intensive, coal 
extraction and use involves additional environmental pollutants that have adversely affected 
e.g. mining communities around the UK. 
 Value-differences focused on the instrumental / efficiency of CCS versus climate change 
focused environmental values.  Some people bristle at the concept that CCS power plants 
reduce the efficiency of fossil fuel use, hence requiring more coal extraction, transport and 
preparation and burning for exactly the same output as pre-CCS. Others find the concept of 
storing CO2 in rock formations to be wasteful and hold out for a more productive use of 
captured CO2, and are concerned that it might constitute an environmental burden for future 
generations. 
 Distrust of CCS with respect to future use of coal. Some people are suspicious of CCS because 
they believe that it is used as a convenient rationale to justify construction of new coal power 
plants, which are unlikely to ever have CCS installed to 100% of the flue gas outputs (and 
probably to a much lower percentage). Hence, according to this perspective, CCS could 
actually increase net CO2 emissions relative to no CCS. The use of captured CO2 for enhanced 
oil recovery (EOR) may serve only to enhance these concerns about CCS perpetuating a fossil 
fuel economy. The UK’s current carbon capture and readiness policy may do little to alleviate 
these concerns as requirements for additional upfront investment in capture kit are minimal. 
 
4.   Four Levels of Justification  
 
 Figure One shows four ways of justifying project approval.  
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Figure One:  Four Levels for Justification of Project Selection (after Frank Fischer) 
 
o Technical Verification – has an appropriate risk assessment been undertaken?  Many 
questions have been raised about technical uncertainties associated with CO2 geological 
storage (CGS), in particular the risk of leakage and monitoring. The relevant technical 
communities have not always responded well to questioning on risks, with some 
scientists tending to present a blanket view that ‘there is no risk of leakage’, a position 
which is not easily defended by recourse to scientific argument because uncertainty 
regarding the long-term consequences of CO2 storage and impacts of leakage remains. 
(When challenged, such scientists have responded, ‘there are no risks because we will 
make sure we don’t store CO2 where there could be risks of leakage’. However, this 
answer is only convincing if the audience already have a high level of trust in the 
scientists – which cannot be assumed). The common response by geoscientists has bred 
suspicion from members of the public that they are not ‘hearing the whole story’ and are 
being fed a sanitised version of a more complex reality.  
o Situational Validation – is it appropriate to locate the facility here?  In the case of 
Barendrecht, one source of opposition was that the community perceives that the town 
already suffers from excessive infrastructure and the idea of even more development 
was unpopular and unfair (‘why should we have to put up with even more 
development?’). In other cases, the reason for objecting to the location is its unspoilt 
and rural character.  
o Social Vindication – is CCS an appropriate part of energy policy? Does using 
decarbonsied fossil fuels really help us move to a sustainable energy system or does it 
merely prolong our reliance on fossil fuels and reduce incentives for a more radical 
transition?  Will CCS lock-us further into the fossil fuel economy and reduce incentives 
for developing non-fossil alternatives by ‘letting us off the hook’ and believing we’ve 
solved the problem?  Isn’t CCS solving the symptoms of the problem rather than the root 
cause?  The public are interested in discussing such questions (as was patently evident 
from the SiteChar Moray citizens’ panel, see Moray Focus Conference Report, 2012) 
(http://www.sitechar-co2.eu/Sections.aspx?section=558.558.583.584 ) and frustration is 
sometimes expressed that there is not a way of engaging with policy makers on energy 
policy issues.  Where there is no formal way of discussing national-level policy (e.g. 
through the usual representative democratic channels), or any such opportunities are 
perceived as being very limited,  some members of the public will attempt to raise 
energy policy issues and related concerns during local planning disputes. 
o Ideological choice – Is energy policy consistent with peoples’ ideological beliefs?  Despite 
decades of scientific assessments, large swathes of the public still do not share in the 
IPCC’s consensus on anthropogenic climate change (ACC).  Rather than continuing to try 
and persuade the public through yet more ‘authoritative’ assessments of ‘scientific 
consensus’, it is more useful to understand that different ideological positions are rooted 
in fundamentally different values. If people do not believe in ACC will they accept CCS?   
Figure Two illustrates the rather complex foundations for support in CCS, all the way 
from believing in ACC to accepting the need for continued use of fossil fuels as a key 
component of the fuel mix.  If any of these foundational levels are not accepted, the 
case for CCS is weakened. (Where CO2 is used for Enhanced Oil Recovery and 
subsequently stored, a direct finance revenue-raising rationale can emerge, but EOR-CCS 
currently looks too expensive in the North Sea context. There are also suggestions that 
EOR-CCS reduces support from NGOs who were previously cautiously supportive of CCS 
as a bridging climate change mitigation technology.)   
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Figure Two:  The CCS Rationale Pyramid (source: Markusson, Shackley, Evar, The Social Dynamics 
of Carbon Capture and Storage, Routledge, 2012)  
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=NvRNqpzMrwMC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q
&f=false 
 
5. Due Process  
 
 A further source of opposition is related to procedural conduct and effective project 
management. Here the question is not so much ‘are they [companies, the government, 
scientific advisors] trustworthy’ but rather ‘are they competent’? For example, if processes 
for participation are not effectively designed or implemented, distrust in the institutional 
capacity for listening and responding to public concerns will become evident. An example 
from Barendrecht is when it took one year for the developer to provide an answer to a 
question on the project from a local representative. Whatever the reasons for such a long 
delay, the perception can readily arise that the developer and/or government is either not 
listening or is incompetent. 
 Related to the above point, opposition may arise if publics perceive CCS deployment to be a 
‘done deal’ by the time engagement commences. As seen with the Moray Citizens’ panel on 
CCS and early public consultation for the QICS experiment  (www.bgs.ac.uk/qics) in west 
Scotland, opposition may arise if publics get the impression that participation in an 
engagement process is unlikely to have any real effect on the outcome of the project, or if 
decisions about use of the environment around them have been taken without their 
consultation. 
 Finally, members of the general public have expressed concerns that scientists involved in CCS 
research have vested interests in the development of plant and policies in support of 
widespread implementation.  Such concerns may be alleviated by having scientists 
communicate their reasons for being involved with the research to the general public.  
However, similar to the point raised about poor communication in the case of Barendrecht, 
not all attempts at communication are equal and shows of competence and trust are central 
to ensure a good dialogue. 
 
6. Examples of Effective Public Engagement  
 
 Not all CCS projects have resulted in public controversy.  Examples of successful public 
engagement include the planned Futuregen project in the USA (which did not, however, 
proceed due to funding changes); and the on-going Decatur (Illinois) ADM project utilising 
CO2 from fermentation. So what explains such successes?  As with the failures, there are 
likely to be multiple explanations but a few reasons are as follows.  
 Provision of new employment opportunities in areas of industrial decline and high 
unemployment.  
 Development of close relationships between companies and trusted higher and further 
educational institutions, where such connections can foster effective relationships and 
communication channels between local residents, community leaders, developers,  
government officials and regulators.  An example here is at the Decatur facility (Illinois) 
which enjoys a close education and training relationship with Richmond Community College, 
including prominently around CCS technologies; 
 History of fossil fuel/hydrocarbon industry in area. An example here is the north-east of 
Scotland around Aberdeen, where many of the companies likely to be involved in offshore 
storage are known to local communities as ‘good and trusted’ employers (who pay well) 
through a long history of generally safe involvement in the oil and gas industry. 
(http://oceanrep.geomar.de/20606/1/Mabon.pdf)  However, as the case of Barendrecht 
shows, this should not be taken to mean CCS will be able to be deployed without 
contestation – and it may also be the case that the economic/employment benefits have 
been unevenly distributed within the host communities. Invitations to members of the 
public in early project consultations may likewise alleviate criticism that decisions have been 
made prior to consultation rounds. 
 
7. Improving Public Engagement on CCS   
 
 How can public perceptions and engagement be improved?  A full list of recommendations is 
provided in the above-mentioned Hammond & Shackley report. Figure Three summarises 
the key steps that any developer should consider when devising public engagement 
strategies on CCS.  While there is a wide range of practice, many developers do not yet 
engage publics, communities and community leaders as actively as desirable or at an early 
enough stage in the project life cycle. There is a frequent desire by developers to ‘control’ 
and ‘manage’ public engagement processes but such attempts can often be counter-
productive as it can come across as over-bearing and an effort at persuasion rather than 
really listening and responding to what is heard.  Consensus is not usually possible or 
necessarily desirable – but what the public do expect is to have their concerns and feelings 
heard and taken seriously and for a due process to consider different opinions before 
coming to a decision. 
 It is important for developers to attempt to understand early on the grounds on which publics 
and stakeholders actually form their opinions on CCS, and tailor subsequent engagement 
accordingly. Communication of the science behind climate change and CCS, and attempts to 
dispel any ‘myths’ about the safety of CCS, are unlikely to be effective on their own if it is 
issues of fairness, justice or values that are driving publics’ concerns.  Processes such as 
social site characterisation can help to understand this context 
(http://oceanrep.geomar.de/20601/)  
 CCS perhaps struggles in that the usual rationale for its acceptance is relatively tightly 
bounded and rests on a linear sequence of assumptions. Compare this to, say, wind power, 
which is justified by developers in terms of energy security, declining costs over time, pride 
in innovation and permanence of supply as well as environmental benefits. It may thus be 
helpful to imagine alternative ‘pathways’ to engagement on CCS, for example energy 
security, reducing pollution and so on that can engage a wider range of actors. 
 Such pathways could conceivably include bioenergy CCS (BECCS) systems that 
theoretically have the potential to lead to negative CO2 emissions (though ensuring biomass 
feedstock sustainability is critical given that the vast majority of biomass would be imported 
into the UK); CCS for EOR, to decrease dependence on imported oil (this does however raise 
the criticism that CCS systems would directly lead to greater emissions); and pre-combustion 
capture integrated with hydrogen networks to provide a relatively low-carbon form of 
electricity supply. 
 
 
 
Figure Three:  Steps towards public acceptance of CCS projects  (source: Hammond & Shackley, 
2010)  
 
 A lively debate is now underway concerning whether local communities should be 
compensated for bearing the burden of energy infrastructural developments such as wind, 
nuclear and hydraulic fracturing.  It has been proposed that a financial sum could be 
transferred to a legitimate local organization, or to a public body such as local authority or 
agency, to spend to improve and enhance local communities, facilities and (wanted) 
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Local Economy 
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infrastructure (cycle lanes, sports centres, swimming pools, play areas in parks, nature 
reserves, etc.).  
 This sort of compensation in return for accepting energy infrastructure projects is already 
commonly practiced in some countries such as the USA, Australia and France. There are 
different viewpoints on this complex issue, with some concerned at attempts to ‘bribe’ 
communities into accepting projects. Where there is already structural inequality and a 
concentration of facilities such as power plants, pipelines, electricity pylons and overhead 
cables, landfill and other waste repositories, the addition of a CO2 capture plant and 
associated pipelines would need to be examined very carefully and any compensation 
package scrutinized to ensure that a vulnerable community is not being manipulated.  
 Perhaps an overarching point about how developers can ‘do’ engagement better relates to 
striking the balance between the possibility of making tangible changes to the project as a 
result of dialogue, versus the realities of decision making (physical limitations to storage 
sites, complexity of political processes). Starting engagement early whilst some of the 
project details are still open for discussion, but at the same time being clear from the outset 
about what participation can and cannot hope to achieve, would be a real advance on 
current practice. Such early dialogue might also indicate what types of compensation would 
be appropriate and this could potentially entail a package of low-carbon options such as 
energy efficiency in local housing, decarbonising personal transport, behavior change and 
community action, etc., to avoid the criticism identified in social science research that CCS 
solves the symptoms not the root cause of the climate change problem.  
 
 
 
 
